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Abstract— Recently, Bluetooth technology is widely used by 
organizations and individuals to provide wireless personal area 
network (WPAN). This is because the radio frequency (RF) 
waves can easily penetrate obstacles and can propagate without 
direct line-of-sight (LoS). These two characteristics have led to 
replace wired communication by wireless systems. However, 
there are serious security challenges associated with wireless 
communication systems because they are easier to eavesdrop, 
disrupt and jam than the wired systems. Bluetooth technology 
started with a form of pairing called legacy pairing prior to any 
communication. However, due to the serious security issues found 
in the legacy pairing, a secure and simple pairing called SPP was 
announced with Bluetooth 2.1 and later since 2007. SPP has 
solved the main security issue which is the weaknesses of the PIN 
code in the legacy pairing, however it has been found with some 
vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attacks. Since the discovery of these vulnerabilities, 
some enhancements have been proposed to the Bluetooth 
Specification Interest Group (SIG) which is the regulatory body 
of Bluetooth technology; nevertheless, some proposed 
enhancements are ineffective or are not yet implemented by 
Manufacturers. Therefore, an improvement of the security 
authentication in Bluetooth connection is highly required to 
overcome the existing drawbacks. This proposed protocol uses 
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm 
with Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256). The implementation of 
this proposal is based on the Arduino Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE) as software and a Bluetooth (BT) Shield 
connected to an Arduino Uno R3 boards as hardware. The result 
was verified on a Graphical User Interface (GUI) built in 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 with C sharp as default 
environment. It has shown that the proposed scheme works 
perfectly with the used hardware and software. In addition, the 
protocol thwarts the passive and active eavesdropping attacks 
which exist during SSP. These attacks are defeated by avoiding 
the exchange of passwords and public keys in plain text between 
the Master and the Slave. Therefore, this protocol is expected to 
be implemented by the SIG to enhance the security in Bluetooth 
connection.  
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I.  Introduction  
A wireless personal area network (WPAN) “Fig. 1,” is a 
short-distance wireless network specially designed to support 
portable and mobile computing devices such as personal 
computer (PC), personal digital assistants (PDA), cell phones, 
printers, pagers, storage devices,  and a variety of consumer 
electronic equipments [1]. Bluetooth technology which was 
developed to replace the existing wire line connections is used 
in WPAN with short-range interconnectivity. Moreover, 
Bluetooth radio operates in the license-free and globally 
available Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band at 2.4 
GHz [2] using Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) 
and are capable of transmitting voice and data [3]. Bluetooth 
provides enough bandwidth that enables data exchange 
between several mobile devices at a rate up to 1 Mbps [1] for 
version 2.0 (and earlier) and up to 3 Mbps for version 2.1 (and 
later) [4][5]. Bluetooth standard is designed for downward 
compatibility which means that the latest versions can support 
all features available in old versions. In Bluetooth connection, 
a piconet is a small network created on an ad hoc basis that 
includes one master device and up to seven slaves while a 
scatternet is chain of piconets that allows one or more 
Bluetooth devices to be a slave in one piconet and act as the 
master for another piconet, simultaneously [4]. 
Fig. 1. Introduction to Bluetooth connection  
In order for two Bluetooth devices to communicate within 
a piconet, they need to perform a mutual authentication. 
During the mutual authentication, pairing is performed in 
order to establish the connection. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II 
discusses the existing pairing methods and the corresponding 
limitations. Section III provides related works on the actual 
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pairing methods. The proposed authentication scheme is 
described in section IV followed by an implementation result 
in section V. Section VI gives the discussion and a conclusion 
is shown in section VII.  
 
II. Existing Pairing Methods and 
their Limitations 
A. Legacy Pairing  
The legacy pairing is vulnerable to different security issues 
such as weak PIN code, passive and active eavesdropping. 
This method of pairing requires each device to enter a 
Personal Identity Number (PIN) code in order to perform 
pairing. Pairing is successful only if both devices enter the 
same code. In [6], it is stated that many Bluetooth devices 
today use a 4-digits PIN or a fixed PIN of commonly known 
values which significantly limit the security of the link key. 
Therefore, during the pairing procedure there is a very high 
probability for an attacker to get the used PIN as in [7] [8] [9].  
B. Secure and Simple Pairing (SSP) 
In SSP the pairing process is enhanced and became simple 
and more secure due to the non-use of a fixed PIN code. 
However, several attacks have been reported recently on it:  
Attacks on the Just Work Model: A Bluetooth non-input non-
out man-in-the middle attack (BT-NINO-MITM) in the just 
work model was identified in [12] and implemented in [11]. In 
[13], it is published a novel Bluetooth MITM attack called 
BT-SPP-Printer-MITM attack against the just work model. 
Besides that, an attack called Bluetooth-Secure and Simple 
Pairing- Headset/Hands-Free-Man in the middle attack (BT-
SSP-HS/HF-MITM) was proposed in [14]. To perform the 
attack, the authors exploited the fact that most Headset/Hands-
Free Bluetooth devices can be forced to choose the less secure 
just work model[12][13]. 
Attacks on the Passkey Entry Model: The possibility of 
successful eavesdropping and MITM attack on the passkey 
entry model has been mentioned in [10] and the 
implementation in the GNU radio software framework using 
the universal software radio peripheral (USRP) as hardware 
can be found in [5].  
Attacks on the Out of Band Model: In [14], it is published a 
Bluetooth-Secure and Simple Pairing- Out of Band-Man in the 
middle attack (BT-SSP-OOB-MITM) and it is shown that the 
attack can be performed if the attacker succeeds to have visual 
contact to the legitimate user’s device. The OOB model was 
suggested to be used as a mandatory model as in [12] [15]; 
nevertheless, in [11] it is also mentioned that this proposal 
cannot work.  
Case of the Numerical Comparison Model: This model is not 
directly attacked; however attackers can force legitimate users 
to select a less secure model instead of this secure model. For 
this reason, in [15] it is mentioned that the numerical 
comparison model is also found to be not secure.   
III. Related Works 
A. Legacy Pairing 
In [16], it was suggested an enhancement of Bluetooth 
authentication using the concatenation of a master’s Clock and 
a Low Address Part (LAP) to be xored with the least 42 bits of 
the Authentication Random Number (AU_RAND) before 
being fed into the E1 algorithm, where the signed response 
(SRES) is computed. However, this improvement has its 
drawbacks since it relies on a symmetric key which is not 
securely shared. 
Moreover, in [17] it was designed an improved 
authentication algorithm using the concatenation of a clock 
and a part of address values (PAV) to compute the 
authentication random number: AU_RAND’ = f (AU_RAND, 
Clock, PAV). However, AU_RAND which is a public 
parameter does not need to be changed because this does not 
prevent to guess the PIN code. Therefore, this enhancement is 
ineffective.  
Reference [18] explored the weakness of the PIN and 
proposed to add a parameter called authentication ID (au_id) 
which is 128 bits in the generation of the initialization key. 
This au_id is shared by using Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
and makes the PIN more robust: PIN’=PIN U au_id. However, 
this current approach remains weak due to the use of the unit 
key and its non-implementation to assess its performance. The 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm used is also prone to 
the MITM attack. 
B. Secure and Simple Pairing 
Reference [19] developed an improved authentication 
algorithm by using SSP which employs Elliptive Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) that is an analog of Diffie-Hellman Key 
Exchange. However, one of the weakness of the ECC is that if 
all ECC users agree on a common set of Elliptive Curve (EC) 
parameters, to negotiate these parameters, the additional 
information needed to specify the exact EC might make the 
effective EC key size to become very large. Another  
drawback of the ECC is that it increases the size of the 
encrypted message more than the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 
(RSA) encryption. It is also mathematically subtle and more 
difficult to implement than the RSA.  
In [13] it is proposed to add a message saying “The second 
message has no display and keyboard! Is this true?” in the just 
work model to solve the BT-NINO-MITM attack. After 
displaying the message, the user may choose “Proceed” or 
“Stop”. However, it is shown that this proposal does not solve 
the attack as in [11]. 
In the view of the above, the authentication procedure in 
Bluetooth connection needs to be improved. 
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IV. Proposed Authentication 
Method 
The proposed model employs a dual authentication which 
is an authentication concept that requires two verifications 
prior to establishing any communication.  
A. Description  
First of all, a master device is nominated and all Bluetooth 
devices in a piconet are registered into the database of the 
master device by assigning a password and a public key to 
each device such that the password and the public key match 
the identity (ID) of the device as in “Table I.”. This process of 
registration and updating the database is executed by the 
administrator of the WPAN. “Table II.” describes all involved 
security entities in the proposed model. 
TABLE I.  DATABASE OF THE MASTER DEVICE 
No Identities Passwords Public Keys 
1 IDA PwdA KUA 
2 IDB PwdB KUB 
3 IDC PwdC KUC 
4 IDD PwdD KUD 
5 IDE PwdE KUE 
6 IDF PwdF KUF 
7 IDG PwdG KUG 
TABLE II.  DEFINITION OF INVOLVED PARAMETERS AND SYMBOLS 
No Parameters Description Size Status 
1 ID = 
BD_ADDR 
Identity = Bluetooth 
device address 
48 bits public 
2 PwdA Password of slave A 128 bits  private 
3 Kc Secret key derived from 
PwdA 
128 bits private 
4 IV Initial Value 128 bits private 
5 KUA  or KUa Slave public key 128 bits public  
6 KRA or KRa Slave private key 128 bits private 
7 Ks Session Key  for AES 128 bits private 
8 K+ HMAC secret key  256 bits private 
9 M HMAC Authentication 
message 
512 bits private 
10 HMAC Authentication Algorithm 
HMAC 
  
11 CA & Cm Slave and master 
commitments values 
256 bits public 
12 ||,  E,  D Concatenation, encryption, 
and decryption Symbols 
  
 
Secondly, we list all initial parameters possessed by both 
devices: 
Slave A: (IDA, PwdA, KUA, KRA,).  
Master: (IDA… IDG, PwdA… PwdG, KUA…KUG). 
B. Different Phases of the Proposed Authentication Scheme 
1) First Authentication Stage (Phase 1): This first phase 
consists of three messages between the master and the slave. It 
will result to a first verification called first authentication stage 
or handshaking. 
Message 1: A slave which would like to establish a secure 
communication with the master device sends its ID to the 
master. 
Message 2: The master receives the ID and checks its database 
to see whether the received ID exists in the data base or not. If 
it exists, the master will derive a secret key (Kc) from the 
corresponding password of the current ID. However, if the ID 
is not registered previously in the database, it means that none 
of the seven devices of the piconet has sent its ID. Therefore, 
the master will ignore the sent ID. Assuming that the ID exists 
in the database, the master generates randomly a session key 
(Ks) and derive a secret key (Kc) from the stored password. 
The derivation of (Kc) is executed as follows: 
 If the password length is less than 16 bytes, zero 
padding is applied to the left most significant bits in 
order to get a key size of 16 bytes.  
 If the password length is exactly 16 bytes, it is used 
directly as a key without any modification. 
 If the password length is greater than 16 bytes, Fanfold 
operation is applied to get 16 bytes. 
A double encryption of the MAC address of the slave 
(IDA) will be executed using the AES encryption with Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) mode which is a recommended mode 
due to its security. The first encryption is done by using the 
session key (Ks) and the second encryption is done by using 
the derived secret key (Kc). The master will send to the slave 
the double encryption (Cipher 2) with the concatenation of the 
encryption of the initial value (IV) “(1)”. 
EKc [EKs (IDA)] || EKUa (IV) = EKc [Cipher 1] || EKUa (IV) = 
Cipher 2 || EKUa (IV)                                                        (1) 
 
The purpose of the double encryption is to identify the 
slave by asking the user to recover cipher 1 as well as to avoid 
the following attack: assuming that an attacker has 
eavesdropped on the wireless connection and captured the 
cipher sent in Message 2, he cannot recover neither cipher 1 
nor the IV because only the legitimate user knows the 
password from which Kc is derived and the private key to 
decrypt the encrypted IV. Upon receiving cipher 2 with the 
concatenation of the encrypted (IV), the user recovers the IV 
by using his private key as in “(2)”.  
DKRa (IV) = IV                                               (2) 
After that, the system prompts him to enter his password 
and derive the same secret key Kc in order to decrypt cipher 2 
as in “(3)”.  
  DKc (Cipher 2) = DKc {EKc [EKs (IDA)]} = Cipher 1    (3)                              
If cipher 1 is successfully recovered, it means that the 
correct password is supplied. Failure to provide the correct 
password will result to abort the connection. 
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Message 3: The user returns to the master cipher 1 together 
with his device ID as in “(4)”. Here the master will decrypt 
cipher 1 by using (Ks) and get the encrypted ID. After that, the 
master will compare the original ID and the sent ID in 
Message 3. If they match, it means that Message 2 was not 
altered and Message 3 is sent by the exact slave. Otherwise, 
the connection will be aborted. This is the end of the first 
authentication stage. 
IDA || Cipher 1 = IDA || EKs (IDA)                          (4) 
2) Exchange of Secret Key (Phase 2): This phase consists 
of one message. 
Message 1: For the purpose of security, it is recommended to 
generate a new secret key instead of re-using the same Ks. 
Thus, the master generates a new session key noted by K+ to 
compute the HMAC algorithm. The master will transfer the 
concatenation of K+ and a message M by using RSA key 
exchange which is a secure method to transfer the session key 
as in “(5)”. With RSA key exchange, secret keys are 
exchanges securely by encrypting them with the public key of 
the intended recipient. Only the recipient can decrypt the 
encrypted key because it requires using his own private key. 
Indeed, a third party who intercepts the encrypted secret key. 
Thus, secrecy and privacy of the session key is well obtained. 
Furthermore, the integrity of the encrypted key is 
accomplished since there is no way to tamper the transferred 
key. RSA algorithm is demonstrated to be reliable with high 
quality, guaranteed security and strong encryption. The 
selection of RSA key exchange is also motivated by its 
simplicity on hardware implementation. 
EKUa [K
+ || M] = Cipher 3                                 (5) 
The slave decrypts cipher 3 using the private key as 
in“(6)”:  
 
DKRa [K
+ || M] = K+ || M                                  (6) 
 
3) Second Authentication Stage (Phase 3): This phase also 
consists of one message. 
Message 1: The slave computes the HMAC algorithm to get a 
commitment value (CA) to be sent back to the master as in 
“(7)”. Meanwhile the master computes Cm as in “(7)”. The 
master device compares CA and Cm. If the two values match, 
it means that both the session key (K+) and the message (M) 
are not altered. However, failure to that requires aborting the 
connection. HMAC is used as the authentication algorithm 
because it can verify data integrity and authentication 
simultaneously. HMAC is employed with the hash function 
SHA256 thus the name HMAC-SHA256.  
 
CA = Cm = HMAC [K
+ || M]                            (7) 
Upon receiving CA, the Master compares CA to Cm and 
decides whether authentication is successful or not.  
4) Exchange of Encrypted Data (Phase 4): This last phase 
consists of many messages depending on the data to share. 
Devices can exchange data securely by using a new generate 
secret key for encryption. The communication can be ended 
by either of the devices. However, in this case the slave will 
end the connection when it will finish exchanging data 
because it initiated the connection for a specific purpose. It 
should be noted that the session key is a temporary key; hence 
for the purpose of security it needs to be changed periodically. 
“Table III.”summarizes the phases of this proposal and “Fig. 
2,” represents the block diagram of the model (page 6).  
TABLE III.  SUMMARY STEPS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL 
 
PHASES MESSAGES BT Devices 
 
 
First Authentication 
Stage 
M1: IDA 
 
Slave to 
Master 
M 2: EKc [EKs (IDA)] || EKUa (IV) 
 
Mater to 
Slave 
M 3: IDA || EKs (IDA) 
 
Slave to 
Master 
Exchange of 
Secrete Key  
M 1: EKUa [K+ || M] Mater to 
Slave 
 
 
Second  
Authentication 
Stage 
M 1: CA = HMAC [K+ || M]  
 
Slave to 
Master 
Meanwhile Master computes:  
Cm = HMAC [K+ || M] 
 
 
Master compares CA to Cm  and 
makes decision 
 
 
Exchange of 
Encrypted Data 
If authentication is successful 
devices exchange data securely. 
Slave to 
Master and 
Mater to 
Slave 
 
V. Implementation Results 
Security consideration: For a correct and good 
implementation, the following security concerns need to be 
taken into consideration: Generation of secret random keys by 
using a strong   random number generator (RNG); Strength of 
the keys; Changing the keys periodically; Secure protection of 
keys; Secure key exchange mechanism; Correctness of the 
used algorithm. 
For the implementation on the mentioned hardware and 
software, the following three libraries have been imported: 
AES-CBC library, RSA library and HMAC-SHA256 library. 
The Arduino board and the Bluetooth shield were connected 
together prior to connecting the board to a laptop running 
Arduino IDE via a USB A to B cable. The code was 
developed on the Arduino IDE then linked to a GUI created in 
Visual studio C sharp environment. “Fig. 3,” shows the 
implementation result on a GUI.  
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“Fig. 3” Implementation result on a GUI.  
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VI. Discussion 
“Fig.3,” shows the workability of the proposal using the 
mentioned hardware and software. All operations are 
computed and shown in different windows of the GUI. The 
result has shown that the security issues in SSP which are 
passive and active eavesdropping are completely tackled by 
preventing the exchange of public keys and passwords in clear 
text. Involved secret passwords and public keys are locally 
stored and the secret parameters (IV and secret keys) are 
generated randomly by using a strong random generator 
number then securely exchanged with the RSA algorithm. 
Other exchanged ciphers cannot be tampered by an attacker 
due to the non-availability of the encryption keys to a third 
user and also the strength of the used encryption systems. 
Moreover, strong and long passwords are supported to 
generate Kc which is used for AES encryption. Passwords are 
kept secret and refreshed periodically. Therefore, it is highly 
expected that this proposal will replace for authentication.  
VII. Conclusion 
This paper started by given an overview of Bluetooth then 
discussed the weaknesses in existing authentication methods. 
Besides that, some improved works have been reviewed prior 
to outlining the proposed solution for the current security 
issues in Bluetooth connection. The model was validated by 
using a BT shield connected to an Arduino board and the 
obtained result was observed with conformity in a GUI. The 
entire process of the authentication was clearly shown in 
snipped windows. The proposal defeats eavesdropping and 
MITM attacks which exist in SSP and is therefore seen to be 
the third authentication method in Bluetooth. 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the model 
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